Bahrain: a "canary in the coal mine"

In my late teenage years and later on, it seemed like every other person had plans to get to the "Gulf": to the many countries around the Persian Gulf.  One cousin has now lived practically his entire adult life there, and we joke that he has become a sheikh himself! 

Bahrain was one of those attractors.  It was favored, in particular, over destinations like Saudi Arabia, because of its better climatic conditions thanks to it being a small island, and because of its relatively liberal and relaxed attitudes .  BTW, Bahrain is so liberal that a sex shop opened there, and owned by a woman, and generated a whole lot of controversy!

Thomas Friedman pointed out in articulating his "First Law of Petropolitics" why Bahrain might be on this path that is far away from the rigid social structure in neighboring Saudi Arabia to which it is linked by a fantastic engineering creation that extends over 16 miles--it was dealing with very limited petroleum reserves.  Friedman summarized it succinctly:

Bahrain is the first Arab gulf state to be running out of oil. It also happens to be the first Arab gulf state to hold a free and fair election where women could run and vote. And it also happens to be the first Arab gulf state to sign a free trade agreement with the United States. And it also happens to be the first Arab gulf state to be reforming its labor laws so its people can no longer be dependent on foreign workers.

So, what is the problem that merits the tag of "canary in the coal mine" you ask?  Seventy percent of the Bahraini population is Shia, like the majority in Iran, and very much unlike the overwhelmingly Sunni Saudi Arabia.

Which is why recent reports, like this one, merit our serious attention:

Bahrain's top Shiite politician said a crackdown on Shiite protesters by Sunni rulers has destroyed a decade of stable sectarian relations as the tiny Gulf state heads into parliamentary elections scheduled for October.

The wave of detentions — at least 160, according to one lawyer — has spilled over into near daily clashes between the majority Shiites and Sunni-led security forces and fueled concerns of deeper unrest and heavy-handed tactics in the home of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet.

Any serious breakdown in Bahrain has possible wider repercussions. The country's two groups mirror the regional tug-of-war between Shiite giant Iran and the mostly Sunni Gulf nations that fear Tehran's efforts to expand its influence.

Given Bahrain's location--right in the Persian Gulf and near the 30-mile wide Strait of Hormuz, one can easily see why developments in this island country can reveal a lot about the geopolitical tensions there.

It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home

That is the bottom line from Col. Timothy Reese:

The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

Yes, please bring them home.
And, more importantly, please do not keep sending more to Afghanistan.

How fast will Iraq unravel?

The first bombing has happened after the US forces pulled out of the cities. How much ever I want to be optimistic about Iraq, I find it terribly troubling to think about that mess. Thomas Ricks has clearly articulated the reasons why I have been, and continue to be, troubled:

My worry is that I don't see the political situation as being much different than it has in the past. Nothing much has changed from the previous rush to failures. As readers of this blog have seen me say before: the surge succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, as planned, it created a breathing space in which a political breakthrough might occur. But Iraqi leaders, for whatever reason, didn't take advantage of that space, and no breakthrough occurred. All the basic issues that faced Iraq before the surge are still hanging out there: How to share oil revenue? What is the power relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurd? Who holds power inside the Shiite community? What is the role of Iran, the biggest winner in this war so far? And will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what happens when all the refugees outside the country and those displaced inside it, who I think are majority Sunni, try to go back to their old houses, now largely occupied by Shiites and protected by Shiite militias?

A secondary issue is how Iraqi forces will behave once they are operating without American forces watching them. There are a lot of "Little Saddams" in Iraq. That didn't used to be our problem-but now these guys have been trained, equipped and empowered by us.

I hope I am wrong, and that Iraq really is embarking on a new course this week. But I don't think so. So I think the real question now is: How fast will the unraveling occur?

I really wish George Carlin were alive and well enough to do his blunt comedy routines that are the most truthful ones on any situation. I remember how he satirized war as sex and rape--that even the terms we use are that way. I blogged about this earlier too ....

U.S. recognizing links between Afghanistan and Pakistan

Slowly and steadily we are beginning to recognize the geopolitical importance of a stable Pakistan. President Obama’s administration now operates with a more nuanced “AfPak” approach, fully recognizing that Afghanistan and Pakistan need to be tackled together.

Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan are also neighbors, with a border that simmers with its own set of ethnic disputes, religious tensions and drug trafficking.

The best way to understand the Iran-Pakistan border issues is to start with one of the most under-reported stories from two weeks ago. At least 20 people were killed, and more than 50 were injured, when a bomb exploded in a mosque in the city of Zahedan in Iran. Zahedan is the capital of Iran’s southeastern province of Sistan-Balochistan, and the city is practically at the junction of the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

At least three aspects of this bombing deserve our attention.

First, this part of Iran has a predominant Sunni population in a country that is otherwise majority Shiite. Keep in mind that Iran and Iraq are home to Shiite Muslims, while surrounded by Sunni majority countries.

Second, the explosion came only a few days before the presidential elections, which are scheduled for Friday. Further, the explosion occurred only three days after a historic trilateral meeting in Tehran of the presidents of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Third, and most important, a group called Jundallah claimed responsibility for this blast. Jundallah, which means “soldiers of Allah,” has gained strength in the post-Sept. 11 years. Jundallah claims to be fighting the Iranian government to secure equal rights for the Sunni and the Baloch people.

The Balochs are spread across the modern boundaries of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the largest province — in terms of land area — is Balochistan, where about half of the 10 million population is ethnically Baloch.

During the days of the empire on which the sun never set, the British were more interested in protecting the “jewel in the crown” — the Indian subcontinent — and, therefore, treated the unconquerable Afghanistan and the territory of the Balochs as a buffer against the threat of an expanding Russia.

When the British created Pakistan in 1947, Balochistan remained quasi-independent until 1948, when it was annexed into Pakistan. A feeling of second-class treatment has slowly led to the emergence of a significant Baloch militant movement. The Pakistani government has no control over 10 percent or more of Balochistan, land that is now under the control of separatists.

The Balochs are yet another aspect of intricate relationships among Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The bombing in Zahedan was not the first time that Jundallah struck in Iran. The significant difference when compared to its violence the last few years is that Jundallah almost always targeted Iran’s security forces and other officers of the government.

Until the recent mosque bombing, never have such a large number of civilians fallen victim to Jundallah.

To add another layer of complexity: Iran has consistently viewed this militant organization as one that has support from Pakistan and the United States.

Iran alleges that the U.S. aids Jundallah — directly or through Pakistan. Of course, Iran has no evidence to support these allegations.

So, what do all these mean? It took us almost eight years after the events of Sept. 11, 2001, to understand that stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan is of utmost importance, and that Pakistan is linked to this in many ways. Over the same period, Pakistan has come apart to such an extent that we are now worried about it becoming a failed state with nuclear arms.

I hope that our leaders have a clear understanding of the limits of our involvement in AfPak so that we do not end up staying there even one day longer than we absolutely have to. And, I certainly hope that we will not enlarge our engagement into the Iranian issues.

For The Register-Guard

Posted to Web: Wednesday, Jun 10, 2009 05:44PM
Appeared in print: Thursday, Jun 11, 2009, page A7

Violent days ahead?

Wednesday the 7th is Ashura. As much as a holy day it is for Muslims--the Shiites in particular--it has also been punctuated with violence:

On June 20, 1994 explosion of a bomb in a prayer hall of Imam Reza shrine
in Mashhad[31] that killed at least 25 people.[32] The Iranian government
officially blamed Mujahedin-e-Khalq for the incident to avoid sectarian conflict
between Shias and Sunnis.[33] However, the Pakistani daily The News
International reported on March 27, 1995, "Pakistani investigators have
identified a 24-year-old religious fanatic Abdul Shakoor residing in Lyari in
Karachi, as an important Pakistani associate of Ramzi Yousef. Abdul Shakoor had
intimate contacts with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and was responsible for the June 20,
1994, massive bomb explosion at the shrine Imam Ali Reza in Mashhad."[34]

The 2004 (1425 AH) Shi'a pilgrimage to Karbala, the first since Saddam Hussein was removed from power in Iraq, was marred by bomb attacks, which killed and wounded hundreds despite tight security.

On January 19, 2008, 7 million Iraqi Shia pilgrims marched through Karbala city, Iraq to commemorate Ashura. 20,000 Iraqi troops and police guarded the event amid tensions due to clashes between Iraqi troops and members of a Shia cult, the Soldiers of Heaven, which left around 263 people dead (in Basra and Nasiriya).[35]

Juan Cole has a neat post on this; he starts with the following observation:

The Gaza War is coming at a poignant time for the Shiite world, since the opening 10 days of the first month of the Muslim year, Muharram, are a time of mourning for the martyred grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Husayn b. Ali. The tenth of the
month, called Ashura, is especially sacred. Some Shiites hold public processions and beat, whip or cut themselves in grief that Husayn was struck down by forces of evil. It is therefore a season of heightened emotionalism, in which the focus is on grieving for the weak, cut down by powerful forces of oppression.